Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad.

In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.”

Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:

THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?

When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:

THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?

MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.

Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:

MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.

Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:

SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.

THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?

SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.

Well said, General.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Senate, Posture Review, Air Force (all tags)

Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.”

Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted.

Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support.

In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:

The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, CTBT, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Senate (all tags)

As analysts prepare for the impending release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (see 1 – 2 – 3), a grading scale would help to illustrate which policies are under consideration. Thankfully, Prof. Tom Sauer provided such a scale in “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” his contribution to the October 2009 issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Sauer argues that nuclear weapons states may choose to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons in their security policies sooner than is commonly expected. He then digs into some Global Zero analysis towards the end, so if that’s your bag, check him out.

Here is the excellent typology Sauer presents for considering nuclear weapons policy. Click to enlarge.

Here are the definitions and historical examples Sauer uses to illustrate his typology.

Nuclear Primacy
Description: the capability to eliminate the nuclear weapons force of the enemy with a first strike
Example: U.S. during the late 1940s

Maximum Deterrence
Description: role of nuclear weapons in the defence posture is emphasized, literally maximized, in order to squeeze as much benefit as possible out of deterrence
Examples: U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War; U.K. and France during the Cold War, albeit at much lower levels

Minimum Deterrence
Description: minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons…a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable
Examples: current postures of Israel, France, and U.K.; perhaps the U.S. and Russia in 15-20 years?

Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear weapons are able to deter thanks simply to their existence, regardless of the nature of the nuclear posture
Examples: China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan, although the latter two want to move up the chart

Post-Existential Deterrence
Description: nuclear deterrence without the existence of nuclear weapons (i.e. tracking Mazarr)
Examples: Japan and Germany

When the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review comes out in the next few weeks, analysts might ask how closely it adheres to Sauer’s full description of minimum deterrence:

Minimum deterrence tries to minimize the emphasis on nuclear weapons. According to minimum (and existential) deterrence, in contrast to maximum deterrence, a secure second-strike force does not require a very large arsenal, as long as a small number of nuclear weapons are invulnerable. As long as the opponent believes that he can be attacked with tens of nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike, the fear of assured destruction will prevail. Parity, let alone superiority, is therefore not a requirement. Because of the relatively small nuclear forces, counterforce targeting and massive attack options are excluded. To the same extent, high alert rates are not needed, except maybe for the invulnerable part of the arsenal. A no-first-use declaratory policy then also becomes an option, at least for states that cannot be easily overrun by non-nuclear means.

How will the Obama administration’s review stack up?

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Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, Obama Administration (all tags)

During last week’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the fiscal year 2011 U.S. Navy budget request, Senator John Thune (R-SD) stuck to his parochial and political guns by quizzing the witnesses about U.S. nuclear force posture. His line of attack on the administration’s policy process suggests an argument that opponents of New START may advance during Senate debate on the agreement, whenever that occurs.

Following an exchange on nuclear delivery vehicles (pun!), Thune cited last year’s Guardian article and asked whether it was true that President Obama had rejected the Pentagon’s previous Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) draft because it was too timid. This question dovetailed with the “numbers game” criticism I dissected last week, wherein conservatives claim that the White House is cutting nuclear weapons sans either strategy or international/ intragovernmental consultations.

In response, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead detailed just how inclusive and accountable the Obama administration’s NPR process has been. He said:

I've been involved in the NPR and I believe that the process we've had, the considerations we've had, has placed great value on our nuclear deterrent force, all legs of that triad, and the considerations of being able to feel the strategic needs of the nation.

[snip]

I'm very comfortable with the discussions we've had, the involvement that we've had, and how we're looking at things.

[snip]

I think as we have worked our way through what's a very complex process, I've been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having, sir.

Policymakers and analysts will inevitably disagree about what the new NPR contains. Yet there is clear evidence that the White House has not unilaterally imposed its agenda on the Pentagon. The process has been collaborative, responsible, and, perhaps as a consequence, a teensy bit behind schedule.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Senate, Congress, Posture Review, Obama Administration (all tags)

From the gang called Russians with attitudes, crazy motherf***** named Putin said yesterday that Russia should proceed with building a new nuclear-capable bomber.

Putin’s statement comes as President Obama is ramping up funding for development of the next generation U.S. nuclear submarine and bomber.

Now boys, are we merely seeking to keep capabilities in tip top shape, or are we having a resolve contest in the middle of negotiating a nuclear reductions treaty? Yes yes, we’re all seriously committed to blowing each other up in the most stylish manner possible. Let’s get on with the reductions now, shall we?

Alternatively: pandering to Russian military-industrial complex while recapturing Soviet glory days = Putin for Prez 2012.

UPDATE 3/3: In retrospect, the picture caption probably should have been “Long pole in the nuclear tent.” I regret the oversight.

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Nukes on a Blog, Russia, New START, Posture Review, Navy, Air Force (all tags)

John Bolton takes to the pages of the Washington Times today to assail President Obama’s supposedly naïve obsession with nuclear reductions. One of Bolton’s central criticisms is that the Obama administration is placing numbers ahead of strategy. He writes...

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Posture Review, Obama Administration (all tags)

The big funding increase for nuclear nonproliferation has become, at this point, a well-developed part of the narrative surrounding the new fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget. Vice President Biden messaged it in the Wall Street Journal. An administration apparatchik followed up on background with tastemaker Laura Rozen. And the press guys (and they are all guys) covered it: Fleck, Landay, Matishak, Pincus, and Ambinder.

More nonproliferation funding is always good. If the Pentagon is as serious about stopping nuclear terrorism as the 2010 QDR suggests, it ought to spend at least 0.074 percent of its total budget on Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, as is proposed for FY 2011, right?

Yet there’s more to the nuke game than nonproliferation. Yep, you guessed it: I’m talking about hardware. How much leg did the FY 2011 budget show on new nuclear bombers and submarines? And what does it mean for President Obama’s arms control agenda? Read on, read on…

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Posture Review, Navy (all tags)

NNSA isn’t the only agency looking to get paid next fiscal year. From the Air Force’s budget summary:

Starting in FY 2011 the B-2A will receive funding across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to improve the [Defensive Management System] on the aircraft. This initiative will allow the B-2A to continue operations around the world in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. The B-2A will also have funding increased for the Weapon System Support Center (WSSC) which enables testing of current as well as developmental aircraft systems. The B-52H is undergoing several modernization programs in order to maintain its viability through 2040. Current initiatives include installing the 1760 bus on the B-52H for increased smart weapon capability while progressing with the Strategic Radar Replacement program, aimed at replacing its current radar (which is experiencing sustainment and obsolescence issues). The B-52H Extremely High Frequency program integrates communications and data and supports United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements for secure, survivable communications via Emergency Action Messages.

As part of the effort to sustain ICBMs, funding was realigned in FY 2011 to complete the installation of new environmental control systems at the launch facilities. The Air Force also procured more Minuteman III test equipment over the FYDP to provide the necessary flight test components for follow-on test and evaluation launches to ensure reliability, accuracy and viability of the fielded ICBM force. Additionally, funding provided for the development of software to validate message generator processes critical for nuclear certification. The FY 2011 Budget Request includes $295M to modernize out-dated fuzing mechanisms and to sustain test equipment and environmental control systems for the aging but capable Minuteman III ICBMs. The UH-1N that supports missile launch complexes will begin replacement activities with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of FY 2015. The Air Force continues to analyze and address requirements to maintain the Minuteman III ICBM to 2030 as directed by Congress.

Raise your right hand and repeat after him: The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is…

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Nukes on a Blog, Air Force, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Posture Review (all tags)

According to Reuters, the forthcoming Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 defense budget “foresees spending about $4 billion over the next five years to maintain the U.S. bomber industrial base, study plans for a possible new bomber, and upgrade existing B-2 and B-52 bombers.” Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ashton Carter said yesterday that when it comes to details about the new bomber, "We will provide an answer on what comes next on that within the next year." Secretary Gates said previously that the new bomber would likely get around $1 billion in FY 2011.

At a HASC subcommittee hearing yesterday, CBO analyst Eric Labs said that building 12 new SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines to replace the 14 Ohio-class subs could cost around $85 billion, with the lead ship costing $11 billion and subsequent ships costing $7 billion apiece. More modern construction techniques could help hold down costs; however, increased labor and material costs, the enhanced capabilities of all Navy subs, and the current low rate of ship construction (i.e. fixed overhead costs spread over fewer ships) might push costs upward.

At the same hearing, CRS analyst Ronald O’Rourke made the point that if the Navy pays for the new SSBN(X) out of its regular shipbuilding budget, it would have to steal money from other programs. This could reduce the total number of ships the Navy is able to procure by 56 (20 percent) and “make a substantial consolidation of some kind of the surface ship construction industrial base a distinct possibility, if not a likelihood,” according to O’Rourke. To deal with this problem, the Navy has started asking whether or not an individual service like the Navy should be responsible for spending so much of its own budget on “force structure elements that serve a national mission of strategic nuclear deterrence,” as O’Rourke put it. Loren Thompson suggested to HASC the creation of a “separate, strategic funding” category for the SSBN(X) that would keep it separate from other shipbuilding programs, a model similar to how the Department of Energy pays for U.S. nuclear warheads even though they are fielded aboard DOD-financed delivery vehicles.

One last thing covered at the hearing was the issue of ship requirements for the Obama administration's rejiggered plan for U.S. missile defense in Europe (yeah, we might consider Aegis missile defense a "strategic" budget priority now). For more detail, read what both Labs and O'Rourke said.

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Nukes on a Blog, Table Scraps, Iran Watch, Missile Defense, Defense Spending, Posture Review, Acquisition, Navy, Air Force (all tags)

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament today released its big report, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers.” At over 300 pages and with 76 recommendations and loads of supplemental data, this report is an arms control abbondanza. The commissioners are ballers, too.

Here are five of the report’s more significant recommendations…

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Nukes on a Blog, CTBT, START, Posture Review, New START, Extended Deterrence (all tags)