Friend of NoH Johan Bergenas hit the online pages of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday to make that case that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, while something we should seek to prevent, would not cause a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East.  He makes a persuasive case, because, well…Johan is a persuasive guy.  And did I mention that the piece has a great title: “The Nuclear Domino Myth”?  Nice.  

Come get some:

But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record  widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964.

The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country nuclear arms race in the region.

[snip]

Predictions of catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries -- expecting that their neighbors will be nuclear powers -- to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.

Nightmare scenarios are dangerous for yet another reason: the expected consequences of a nuclear Iran, real or imagined, will determine the policies pursued to prevent Tehran from developing the bomb. If the consequences are out of sync with reality, the methods applied will be disproportional to the threat. Seven years ago, the United States walked into Iraq based on worst-case-scenario predictions about its nuclear program that were far from beyond a reasonable doubt. Washington cannot afford to wage another war on false pretenses.

There is no question that the world would be better off if Iran did not obtain nuclear weapons, and the international community must use all appropriate measures to prevent Iran -- or any other country -- from doing so. But the case against a nuclear Iran is strong enough without a nuclear domino myth. By invoking worst-case scenarios, policymakers are only clouding nuanced thinking.

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Nukes on a Blog, Iran (all tags)

A panel of experts on Monday discussed the utility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, in East Asia in the wake of a nuclear North Korea. The experts agreed that the U.S. policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has been effective symbolically.  

Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
-    to protect and reassure allies;
-    to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
-    to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;  
-    to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

Sayeth Saint Dick:

If it is brought up, "a large number of Republicans will be in favor of the [New START] treaty, but not all of them," he said.

[snip]

"I think a large majority of Republicans agree with me" on arms reduction, he said.

[snip]

“I think we will not deal with the treaty on the floor until after the election."

[snip]

"No I'm not predicting anything" when asked if it will pass by the end of this year, "beyond the fact that I think we will get to the floor and we'll have a chance to vote upon it, debate it in the lame-duck session."

Here’s hoping that Lugar’s optimistic estimate of his colleagues’ support is based on an actual nose count, not an assumption that they are as principled, knowledgeable, and reasonable as he is.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Senate, Congress (all tags)

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter has spent most of the summer arguing that the New START treaty drops the ball on verification.  This is a pretty daft claim, since DeSutter was one of the ring leaders for an administration that believed verification was neither necessary nor useful.  Recall that the Moscow Treaty was entirely devoid of any detailed data exchanges and monitoring and verification provisions.  In the eyes of DeSutter, President Reagan’s signature phrase “trust but verify” read “trust but don't verify”.    

Both Kelsey Hartigan and Greg Thielmann have penned great take-downs of DeSutter's latest contribution, which is particularly stunning and riddled with obfuscation. Writing in the National Review earlier this week, DeSutter alleges:

Had the administration deemed the data provided under START to be critical, they could have extended the START treaty until negotiations on New START were completed and it was ratified by the U.S. and Russia. Instead, they let START expire and negotiated against a deadline after making clear their desperate desire for getting an agreement.[emphasis mine.]

Alas, the 2007 version of Paula DeSutter made an extension of START I next to impossible:

While the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START "has been important and for the most part has done its job," Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter told Reuters the pact is cumbersome and its complicated reporting standards have outlived their usefulness.

In the post-Cold war era, many provisions of the 1991 START accord, which mandated deep nuclear weapons cuts, "are no longer necessary. We don't believe we're in a place where we need have to have the detailed lists (of weapons) and verification measures," added DeSutter.[emphasis mine.]

Kelsey also points out that DeSutter ran roughshod over the verification provisions in other key arms control treaties.

In last week's Washington Post, Walter Pincus noted that the standard by which many Republican Senators are judging New START is markedly different from the one they used to judge the George W. Bush administration's Moscow Treaty. As we've noted on the blog before, nowhere is this more evident than on the issue of verification.  See below the jump for some choice comments from select Republican Senators on verification during the Moscow treaty debate.  Could it be, as former Bush I national security adviser Brent Scowcroft has suggested, that "some just don't want to give Obama a victory" before the midterm elections?

Remember, "trust, but don't verify"...

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, verification (all tags)

Following an August 3 report in the Wall Street Journal, the arms control blogosphere has been buzzing about a nearly finalized nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Vietnam. According to the Journal, and now other outlets including The Guardian and Global Security Newswire , the U.S.-Vietnam deal has considerably weaker proliferation controls than the Obama administration has demanded in the past – specifically, the agreement would allow Vietnam to retain the right to enrich uranium.

The Risks and Benefits of Enrichment

Uranium enrichment technology has both civil and military applications: it can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Any country that possesses enrichment facilities would be able to use this technology to jumpstart a weapons program. But any country without enrichment facilities is unable to independently produce nuclear fuel for its reactors and thus required to import fuel for its nuclear energy program.

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Nukes on a Blog, Security Matters, Obama Administration (all tags)

Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks.  On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.”  Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S.   Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.”   This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show "what a real war is like" if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.

The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise.  As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades.  I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan.  Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

In a statement on the New START treaty with the press this morning, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the full Senate must provide its advice and consent to ratification of the agreement when it returns in September.

“Our national security is at risk,” Clinton said. “It’s been more than eight months since we’ve had inspectors on the ground in Russia” who give “a vital window into Russia’s arsenal.”

Clinton added: The treaty “will advance our national security and provide stability and predictability between the world’s two leading nuclear powers.”

NoH will post a full copy of the statement when it's available.

UPDATE 8/11: Secretary Clinton's full statement is pasted below the jump.

UPDATE #2 8/11: Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE) gave a great speech on New START this morning to open the 2010 Strategic Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Nebraska. His remarks can be found here.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START (all tags)

An advisory panel to Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan is poised to recommend that Japan reevaluate its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, report the Asahi Shimbun, Global Security Newswire, and Bloomberg. The three principles, which comprise some of the most stringent anti-nuclear legislation in the world, have guided Japanese nuclear policy since the 1960s. The principles forbid the possession and production of nuclear weapons by Japan as well as the introduction of foreign nuclear arms into Japanese territory.  

Arguing that “it may not necessarily be wise to have as a principle anything that unilaterally limits what the United States can do,” the panel’s report calls for a review of the third principle’s ban on introducing American arms into Japan. This recommendation comes on the heels of government admissions that the third principle had been violated secretly throughout the Cold War. Even given recent revelations about Cold War secret agreements, however, official governmental approval for the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan would carry significant domestic and international political repercussions.

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Nukes on a Blog, Security Matters (all tags)

You know how New START skeptics in the Senate have complained about the agreement’s verification provisions and definitions, Russian cheating, nuclear modernization, and the supposed lack of dissenting witnesses in hearings?

Yeah, well they didn’t give a hoot about any of that back in 2002 and 2003 when the Senate was considering the Moscow Treaty (aka SORT), according to Walter Pincus’s definitive account in today’s WaPo. Loyal NOH readers will recall our series of posts highlighting this hypocr…uh, open-mindedness! (Here – here – here – here)

But remember, their complaints are serious and have nothing to do with politics. Nothing at all. Not a thing.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, Senate, Congress (all tags)

Snooki, do you think the U.S. Senate should approve New START?

Her response speaks volumes about how passionately people support this agreement.

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Nukes on a Blog, New START (all tags)