A panel of experts on Monday discussed the utility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, in East Asia in the wake of a nuclear North Korea. The experts agreed that the U.S. policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has been effective symbolically.  

Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
-    to protect and reassure allies;
-    to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
-    to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;  
-    to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

The U.S. Treasury Department's website on August 30th announced expanded sanctions on North Korea via a presidential executive order. Washington slapped sanctions on four individuals and eight firms with ties to the North Korean government and the regime's nuclear programs. Room 39 is among the blacklisted entities, which is believed to be engaged in illicit activities that fund Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. The new sanctions are based on President Bush's Executive Order 13382 to curb nuclear and WMD proliferation. Click here for the full text of the announcement.

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U.S., sanctions, North Korea, Treasury, luxury, non-proliferation, executive order, Room 39 (all tags)

Chinese envoy Wu Dawei met with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul on August 26th to discuss the resumption of the six-party nuclear talks on North Korea's nuclear disarmament.  But the meeting merely reaffirmed that the gap in their perception is still wide among the parties.

Wu reportedly proposed resuming nuclear negotiations in three phases, according to South Korean media:

1. Hold U.S.-North Korea direct talks

2.Hold unofficial, preliminary six-party talks privately behind closed doors

3. Hold official six-party talks

Wu reportedly said Beijing and Pyongyang have agreed on this method, and China is now trying to convince Seoul and later Tokyo, Washington and Russia to accept the plan.  The Chinese envoy’s trip coincided with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s North Korea visit and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s China tour.

Reaction to the Proposal?

Seoul and Washington have maintained that Pyongyang must take responsibility over sinking the Cheonan before resuming six-way negotiations.  Many observers believe that Pyongyang is trying to avoid responsibility with China’s help by dangling the possibility of resuming nuclear talks.

Beijing’s handling of the Cheonan incident has upset the other members of the six-party talks (minus Russia). So it may not be easy for China, the chair of the six-party talks, to coax Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. It remains to be seen what card Beijing plays to win the others over.

IF Pyongyang does have the will to denuclearize and proves this with concrete actions, then it will be difficult for Seoul and Washington to endlessly demand an apology before resuming the six-party talks.

The Gap: Still Wide

The problem, which has been so since the first nuclear crisis, is the wide gap in perception between the two sides. On one side, Pyongyang continues to deny its involvement in Cheonan, insist on the lifting of sanctions and insist on signing a peace treaty before denuclearization. On the other side, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo demand denuclearization steps first.

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan are unified in their policy and approach toward North Korea, which has been a rare phenomenon in the past. On the other side is China and North Korea. It is unclear what hidden cards will be played to break the current impasse.

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China, Wu Da-wei, South Korea, North Korea, Kim Jong-il, Cheonan, six-party talks, peace treaty (all tags)

August 25, 2010

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is in North Korea to secure the release of Aijalon Mahli Gomes, a 30-year-old American missionary who was sentenced in May to eight years of hard labor and fined $700,000 for illegally entering the North. Carter met Pyongyang’s nominal leader Kim Young-nam and may even sit down with Kim Jong-il. The trip is significant because the release of an American civilian has once again brought a former U.S. president out of retirement at a time when tensions are high between Washington and Pyongyang as well as on the Korean peninsula. What’s more, it comes at a time when the Dear Leader’s health is said to be deteriorating. History has shown that the political environment tends to warm after a former U.S. president flies to the rescue. Why send Carter now and what can we expect from his trip? Click "read more."

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Jimmy Carter, North Korea, hostage, Gomes, nuclear (all tags)

The U.S. will soon announce a fresh list of sanctions against North Korea to dry up the regime’s illegal cash sources that fund its nuclear weapons programs.  Pyongyang is expected to unleash more provocations, even a third nuclear test, in retaliation as witnessed in the past. Still, the pressure track is expected to continue until the regime changes its behavior or until a leadership transition takes place in the North. Who are the targets of the sanctions? What are the implications and recommendations? Find out more in my analysis at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website.

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North Korea, U.S. sanctions, illicit activities (all tags)

Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks.  On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.”  Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S.   Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.”   This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show "what a real war is like" if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.

The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise.  As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades.  I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan.  Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?

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North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced on July 21 a series of measures to increase Washington’s ability to “prevent North Korea's proliferation, to halt their illicit activities that helped fund their weapons programs and to discourage further provocative actions.”  She added, “We will implement new country-specific sanctions aimed at North Korea's sale and procurement of arms and related material and the procurement of luxury goods and other illicit activities.”  Although the U.S is already committed to implementing exactly these sanctions under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, Ms. Clinton explained that they will now be more strictly imposed in response to steps North Korean entities have taken to adapt to the existing sanctions.   In addition to bolstering current sanctions, Washington also looks set to freeze a number of bank accounts associated with suspect North Korean companies, although on limited scale. So, is this latest development merely a posturing, the seeds of a major change in North Korean behavior, or likely to start a second Korean war?

In answering this question it’s important to look first at the context in which the U.S announcement was made.  March 26 saw the sinking of the Cheonan, on May 26  South Korea released its alleged evidence of North Korean culpability and ever since, U.S rhetoric has continued to condemn Pyongyang’s behavior while also warning of inevitable consequences.  Unfortunately for Washington though, ‘consequences’ did not arise for North   Korea when the Cheonan incident was finally raised at the United Nations Security Council in early July.  While the UNSC statement condemned the sinking of the ROK navy corvette and expressed “deep concern” over South Korea’s investigative report, the carefully worded text excluded any actual reference to the DPRK.  Consequently it came as no surprise that North Korea considered the UNSC statement a “diplomatic victory,” enabling it to elude any formal punishment at the Security Council.  This was of course due to China’s reticence on the issue, which derives from the fact that Beijing was unwilling to call out its communist neighbor by name (just as the U.S is rarely willing to do so with Israel)....

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North Korea, sanctions, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

The United States and South Korea announced a series of joint naval exercises in the Pacific theater on Tuesday, designed to show force and resolve against a stubborn North Korea.  The first of the exercises will begin Sunday and will include ships, aircraft, sailors, and airmen (for a total of about 8,000 personnel) from both the US and Republic of Korea navy and air force.

The display is a direct response to and a continuation of the crisis begun when the South Korean frigate Cheonan was sunk off the coast of the Korean Peninsula on March 26.  An international investigation team concluded that the Cheonan was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine, a charge North Korea and its ally, China, have denied.

The statement said that the exercises “are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop.”  They will occur in both the East and West Seas, known to Americans as Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.

The military presence is quite large, with over a hundred aircraft and 20 ships and submarines, including the American aircraft carrier the USS George Washington.

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Security Matters, North Korea, Navy (all tags)

The U.S and South Korea are not currently implementing policies that will garner positive results with North Korea, nor do they have an over-arching strategy for dealing with the isolated nation, agreed three American experts at a policy forum event in Washington D.C Wednesday.  Assessing the current situation from various perspectives, the panelists all implied that a more proactive, cohesive and long-term approach to engagement with Pyongyang would yield better outcomes for all involved.

Steven Linton, Founder of The Eugene Bell Foundation, a humanitarian organization providing development assistance to North Korea, started his analysis by suggesting that for a very long time North Korea has been looking for a positive and client-type relationship with the United States.  Asking rhetorically how Washington managed to “blow it”, he answered by suggesting that American “ideological constructs” may be partly to blame.  Ideological constructs that suggested ‘carrots’ would make North Korea change as a result of being “overwhelmed [with U.S] sincerity and good intentions”, or inversely, that ‘sticks’ would compel better behavior through the use of sanctions and threats.   He put it to the audience that both of these ideological constructs have “now come face to face with reality and been shattered”.....

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North Korea, nuclear, event, Nukes on a Blog (all tags)

Last week the Council on Foreign Relations released a Task Force report suggesting that the current U.S policy of ‘strategic patience’ offers a ‘time time frame for achieving denuclearization…so vague that there is a significant risk that [it] will result in acquiescence to North   Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli.’ Echoing a frustration shared by many Korea watchers, the report describes the current administration’s efforts toward the objective of denuclearization in North Korea as ‘halfhearted’.  It warns that Washington must up its game and deal with the policy challenges presented by North Korea, ranked according to their fundamental importance: 1) preventing DPRK nuclear proliferation to others; 2) rolling back the nuclear program; and 3) integrating the isolated nation into the international community.

In order to deal with these issues the Task Force first identifies and reviews four policy options for the current administration: (1) explicitly recognizing and acquiescing to a nuclear North Korea; (2) containing and managing the problem; (3) attempting to roll back the program and; (4) pursuing regime change.  The report suggests that while the current policy of ‘strategic patience’ is most similar to option 2, it is now time to pursue this in combination with option 3, including ‘a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs’.

While many will welcome the timeliness of the report and its rightful critique of current policy, it is not clear how the proposed combination of policy options 2 and 3 can offer Washington any new leverage over Pyongyang…

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Nukes on a Blog, North Korea, Engagement, nuclear (all tags)