Despite repeated assertions from both U.S. and Russian officials since December that the New START agreement is on the verge of completion, we’re still waiting for the new treaty.  U.S. and Russian negotiators returned home last weekend, and are expected back in Geneva to resume negotiations on either March 8 or March 15.

So what’s the hold up?  I’ve run across a few reasons:

• It takes time to turn agreements reached in principle into treaty text.  It also takes time to hash out the various annexes, the Memorandum of Understanding, and other associated and supplemental documents that will come with the treaty.

• Russia is not in a hurry to sign a new agreement.  According to a former senior U.S. official who spoke to Laura Rozen, the Russians “are haggling, fighting internally, and trying to figure out how to get more water out of a stone.”  They’re also worried that the U.S. Senate could fail to ratify the agreement.

• Verification.  A senior U.S. official stated in an interview with CNN that “some niggling technical details,” perhaps regarding how to verify actual warhead loadings, are still being worked out.

• Missile defense.  According to a number of different reports, including this one by McClatchy’s Johnathan Landay, missile defense has emerged as an issue.  If Russia is in fact in no hurry to sign an agreement, missile defense could be their chosen means of obstruction.

I want to focus on the missile defense angle for the time being, specifically the Landay piece.  Not only does the article contain a few mix-ups, but I think the impasse is being blown out of proportion, especially since a way forward seems readily apparent.  (Note: this post turned into something much longer than I had hoped so if you have better things to do, I’d suggest doing them; if only I could spin succinct beats like Travis)...  

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Nukes on a Blog, New START, missile defense (all tags)

The Cable’s Josh Rogin reported yesterday that Senators Jon Kyl, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman sent a letter to National Security Advisor James Jones expressing concern that the Russians are continuing to seek limits on U.S. missile defenses in the context of the soon-to-be-completed START follow-on negotiations.

The letter was apparently prompted by reports that the Russians plan to release a statement declaring that they have a right to unilaterally withdraw from the new treaty if they determine that “strategic stability” is upset by U.S. missile defense deployments.

According to the Senators, “Even as a unilateral declaration, a provision like this would put pressure on the United States to limit its systems or their deployment because of Russian threats of withdrawal from the treaty.”

Jonathan Kaplan, a spokesman for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, told Rogin that “Anybody who knows anything about treaties knows that it is customary to be able to withdraw for reasons pertaining to one's national interest, so there's nothing new or diabolical here.”  

The situation is even more ordinary than Kaplan’s statement would suggest…

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Nukes on a Blog, missile defense, New START (all tags)

The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to ensure that New START will not limit U.S. missile defense systems. The initial guidance issued by President Obama made clear that “the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms” was the objective of the negotiations. Michael McFaul, Special Assistant for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, repeated that "We're not going to reassure or give or trade...anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense." Even when the Russians made noise about missile defense in January, administration officials didn’t back down.

This opposition to negotiated constraints on U.S. missile defense systems was strengthened Monday with the publication of the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. This roadmap document, which comprehensively assessed missile defense policies, strategies, plans, and programs, states clearly that the United States will not be appeasing Russia or China anytime soon. The report says:

The Administration also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense. With Russia, it is pursuing a broad agenda focused on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. With China, the Administration seeks further dialogue on strategic issues of interest to both nations, including missile defense. As it pursues these discussions, the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.

[snip]

Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests. The United States will continue to engage them on this issue to help them better understand the stabilizing benefits of missile defense—particularly China, which claims to have successfully demonstrated its own ground-based midcourse interception on January 11, 2010. As the United States has stated in the past, the homeland missile defense capabilities are focused on regional actors such as Iran and North Korea. While the GMD system would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with those countries.

I know, I know: we could spend hours criticizing the theoretical coherence of “the stabilizing benefits” of missile defense or the dripping condescension of the United States trying “to help [Russia and China] better understand” why missile defense is about Freedom, Inc. I’ve taken those ideas to task before (here and here, for starters). So have people who actually know what the hell they’re talking about.

Instead, I just want NOH readers to remember the passages above during the months ahead when opponents of President Obama’s arms control agenda charge that the administration wants to give away missile defense in order to appease Russia and/or China. I honestly don’t think the Obama administration’s commitment to doing the exact opposite could be much stronger—for better or worse.

UPDATE 4PM: At Monday's QDR briefing, USD-P Michele Flournoy fielded a question on U.S. cooperation with Russia/China on missile defense. She said:

With regard to Russia, we, after the European phased adaptive approach decision was made, we did brief them on the change of plans and what the program would look like. We invited them to begin a dialogue with us about shared early warning. Russia has a number of radar systems, other ISR systems that would be very helpful in a more cooperative approach to the defense of that region. And so we've invited them to have that discussion. We're hopeful that they'll take us up on that invitation.

With regard to China, it's been more an invitation to have more strategic dialogue. That covers not only missile defenses but nuclear forces, sort of how we see the security environment and our response to it. It's really trying to inject greater transparency into our discussions about what each country is doing with regard to the development of its military capabilities.

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Nukes on a Blog, Missile Defense, Russia, China (all tags)

According to Reuters, the forthcoming Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 defense budget “foresees spending about $4 billion over the next five years to maintain the U.S. bomber industrial base, study plans for a possible new bomber, and upgrade existing B-2 and B-52 bombers.” Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ashton Carter said yesterday that when it comes to details about the new bomber, "We will provide an answer on what comes next on that within the next year." Secretary Gates said previously that the new bomber would likely get around $1 billion in FY 2011.

At a HASC subcommittee hearing yesterday, CBO analyst Eric Labs said that building 12 new SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines to replace the 14 Ohio-class subs could cost around $85 billion, with the lead ship costing $11 billion and subsequent ships costing $7 billion apiece. More modern construction techniques could help hold down costs; however, increased labor and material costs, the enhanced capabilities of all Navy subs, and the current low rate of ship construction (i.e. fixed overhead costs spread over fewer ships) might push costs upward.

At the same hearing, CRS analyst Ronald O’Rourke made the point that if the Navy pays for the new SSBN(X) out of its regular shipbuilding budget, it would have to steal money from other programs. This could reduce the total number of ships the Navy is able to procure by 56 (20 percent) and “make a substantial consolidation of some kind of the surface ship construction industrial base a distinct possibility, if not a likelihood,” according to O’Rourke. To deal with this problem, the Navy has started asking whether or not an individual service like the Navy should be responsible for spending so much of its own budget on “force structure elements that serve a national mission of strategic nuclear deterrence,” as O’Rourke put it. Loren Thompson suggested to HASC the creation of a “separate, strategic funding” category for the SSBN(X) that would keep it separate from other shipbuilding programs, a model similar to how the Department of Energy pays for U.S. nuclear warheads even though they are fielded aboard DOD-financed delivery vehicles.

One last thing covered at the hearing was the issue of ship requirements for the Obama administration's rejiggered plan for U.S. missile defense in Europe (yeah, we might consider Aegis missile defense a "strategic" budget priority now). For more detail, read what both Labs and O'Rourke said.

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Nukes on a Blog, Table Scraps, Iran Watch, Missile Defense, Defense Spending, Posture Review, Acquisition, Navy, Air Force (all tags)

I’m still sifting through some of the nuclear headlines from the holiday break and wanted to address the hyperventilating in the blogosphere and the media about Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin’s end of the year comments on missile defense.  In a visit to Vladivostok on December 29, Putin stated:

If we don’t develop a missile defense system, a danger arises for us that with an umbrella protecting our partners from offensive weapons, they will feel completely safe….The balance will be disrupted, and then they will do whatever they want, and aggressiveness will immediately arise both in real politics and economics.

The view from the U.S. press seems to be that this means missile defense is the main issue holding up completion of the New START agreement.

Maybe we’re in too much of a “don’t freak out mood” over here at the Center, but I don’t put much stock in Putin’s remarks.  The reality is that despite Russia’s initial positive reaction to the Obama administration’s new approach to missile defense in Europe, it remains deeply concerned about U.S. missile defense plans.  Putin didn’t say anything new…

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Security Matters, Missile Defense, New START, Putin, Russia (all tags)

Earlier today Iran tested an allegedly more advanced version of its solid-fueled Sejjil-2 medium range ballistic missile.  The missile has a similar range to that of the liquid-fueled Shahab-3 (i.e. approximately 2,000-2,500 kilometers) and could reach targets in Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe.

In the wake of today's test, it's worth recalling that the Bush administration's plan to deploy ten long-range ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and an accompanying radar in the Czech Republic was not designed to deal with Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.  Click here for a nice map, courtesy of the BBC, demonstrating the limitations of the GBI-based system.      

In contrast, the Obama administration's modified missile defense plan for Europe is specifically designed to counter the threats posed by Iranian short- and medium-range missiles such as the Sejiil-2.  The new approach will rely on "scores" of SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis ship destroyers, which will be capable of defending more of Europe than the Bush administration's plan. And the initial pieces of the system are slated to be deployed by 2011, some six or seven years before the Polish and Czech sites would have been completed.  As Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright stated in a September 17 press conference announcing the decision:

We built the original system on the idea of a rogue-nation threat: three to five missiles that could come from either North Korea or Iran. The reality is, we’re dealing with hundreds of missiles in the [intermediate-] and medium-range capabilities…. What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than what we have with a ground-based interceptor.

In sum, if you're inclined to view the Sejjil-2 as a major threat, it's tough to argue that the Obama administration's decision to pursue a new missile defense architecture for Europe was the incorrect one.

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Security Matters, Missile Defense, Iran (all tags)

With an annual budget of $48.4 million, you’d think the Heritage Foundation could do better than this:

Arms Control: Out of Control

First it was the cancellation of the Third Site, now Obama is persistent with the ratification of the START follow-on treaty which will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the number of strategic delivery systems. President Obama’s new emphasis on negotiations with Russia isn’t exactly aligned with the ballistic missile threat that the U.S. faces elsewhere. An effective defense strategy is essential to defend our country and President Obama needs to keep this in mind as he moves rapidly towards concluding negotiations with Russia. This treaty, established by the Obama administration, is comprised of linkages--the most prominent among them, the decision of the Third Site, poses limitations to missile defense options. These limitations should not cause Senators to not rush the examination of START follow-on treaty.

If I had to hazard a guess, I’d say some Heritage intern got a little carried away one Thursday night and this passage was the unfortunate consequence on Friday morning. But OMG I just love Smith Point so much!

My personal favorite:

These limitations should not cause Senators to not rush the examination of START follow-on treaty

We agree (I think) that examination of the START follow-on should be expedited.

In fairness, the actual content Heritage analysts produce is much better. And by better, I mean grammatically coherent and useful if you are a Republican Hill staffer who needs to come up with some killer TPs so that your boss can give a good account of himself at the Armed Services Committee hearing that starts in like 5 minutes.

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Nukes on a Blog, START, Missile Defense, Right Wing Rant (all tags)

Well not really.  But yours truly recently did an interview with Foreign Policy in Focus' Gabriella Campos on the Obama administration's new plan for missile defense in Europe.  The full interview can be read here.  A few additional points/clarifications are below the jump.  

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Security Matters, Missile Defense (all tags)

Let me show NOH readers how Peter Brookes gets down. It’s all about favorably defining your variables...

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Iran Watch, Security Matters, Nukes on a Blog, Missile Defense, Russia, China, Right Wing Rant, Obama Administration, Defense Spending (all tags)

This is an expanded version of the piece from a few weeks ago.

Given the important role Capitol Hill will play in enacting or rejecting President Barack Obama’s foreign policy agenda, recent Senate reactions to the reconfigured proposal for European missile defense and to Obama’s appearance at the UN Security Council are worth analyzing as a sign of challenges ahead.

After a thorough survey of press activity, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation concludes that only the sounds of silence have been heard from the Senate – except for Republicans’ predictable disavowal of reformulated plans for missile defense in Europe.

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Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Missile Defense, START, CTBT (all tags)