NOH response to vacuum tubes

Reuters today explains how New START negotiations have devolved into (dis)armed robbery. Money grubbing for nuclear modernization funds is fair, if unbecoming, as part and parcel of congressional sausage production. But not this s*** again:

Corker who along with Kyl and other senators recently visited three national laboratories, called the state of the facilities and weapons, “pretty alarming.” Kyl was struck by the way that Sandia National Lab showed him a plastic container with 1950s-era vacuum tubes that are being replaced with new circuit boards. “They’ve got to get on with this,” Kyl said.

Kingston is going to pop a blood vessel in his eyeball (read his previous diatribes on vacuum tubes).

While horse trading is part of the game, potential treaty skeptics’ funding demands at this point have become rather trifling. Increased nuke money is in the FY 2011 request. It’s in the 10-year plan. It’s in the 20-year plan. Senior administration officials have publicly reiterated their commitment to it. But some senators are unhappy because the planned investment will come from “savings the government hopes to get from interest rates”? Put the nation on a more sound fiscal footing and you won’t have to worry about it, for chrissakes!

Future year budget plans are not set in stone. (Remember when the Bush administration used to project decreased defense spending? Ha! How’d that turn out?) Senators of course understand this variability. They know the administration can’t guarantee future funding streams, as doing so would infringe on Congress’s power of the purse and neuter the U.S. government’s ability to adjust future funding to meet shifting priorities. Congress fights tooth and nail to preserve such flexibility, which is why appropriators are always hesitant to approve multiyear procurement of major weapon systems.

But senators are still objecting on this basis when it comes to nuke modernization. In other words, senators are asking President Obama to guarantee something (modernization funding) that only they themselves can constitutionally guarantee.

The administration has done its part to integrate the modernization program into its future planning, but all it can do is ask for the money. It is up to Congress, including New START skeptics, to provide the funds. Senators: this is ultimately your responsibility, not that of the executive branch. Stop trying to pass the buck.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, New START, Senate, Congress, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, Modernization (all tags)

S. 3454, the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), was posted online yesterday.  The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) completed its mark of the bill on May 27, though it’s not clear when the full Senate will act on it.  Unlike the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), SASC marks up the NDAA behind closed doors.

H.R. 5136, the House version of the NDAA, cleared the full House on May 28.  As you may recall, HASC approved two damaging amendments on nuclear policy, both of which went unchallenged on the House floor.  One provision constrains the ability of the President and senior military leaders to determine the best strategic posture for the U.S., while the other undermines and mischaracterizes the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Fortunately the SASC mark does not include these measures.  On the plus side, the bill contains two essential provisions calling for greater oversight over Life Extension Programs and major NNSA construction projects.  Given the unprecedented amount of money that the Obama administration is proposing to spend refurbishing and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex over the next ten years, it only makes sense that Congress demand additional means of supervision and accountability.  Simply put, these provisions are no-brainers…

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Congress, FY 2011 Budget Request (all tags)

Artist’s conception of a possible design for the SSBN-X

HASC Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor yesterday announced his panel’s decision to “gate” 50 percent of FY 2011 R&D funding for the SSBN-X until the Navy shares its analysis of alternatives for the program. As I wrote previously, Taylor is interested in discovering whether a smaller, cheaper submarine could relieve some of the inevitable pressure on the Navy’s future shipbuilding budget—and just so happen to ensure consistent funding for the surface combatants built in his district.

Here’s CQ Today’s (subscription only) summary of the move:

The bill, if enacted, would restrict 50 percent of the $672.3 million authorized “until the secretary of Defense reports to the committee the guidance which shaped the results of the analysis of alternatives, the time needed to develop and deploy each alternative capability, and the rationale associated with construction of a new class of submarines capable of carrying the current weapon vice development of a smaller missile to fit an existing submarine,” said Seapower panel Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss.

[snip]

Taylor argues that the last Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) already limits the D-5 missile to carrying only eight nuclear warheads, despite its ability to carry more. “Is this very big missile what we need and do we need to build a new submarine for it?” Taylor asked.

The House may not get to vote on arms control treaties, but it certainly has ways to make its presence felt in U.S. nuclear policy deliberations.

UPDATE May 15: Rep. Taylor may indeed smell a rat, generally speaking, with this analysis of alternatives (AOA) business. As GAO reported last year:

Many of the AOAs that GAO reviewed did not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for addressing a warfighting need or assess technical and other risks associated with each alternative

[snip]

Without a sufficient comparison of alternatives and focus on technical and other risks, AOAs may identify solutions that are not feasible and decision makers may approve programs based on limited knowledge

[snip]

While AOAs are supposed to provide a reliable and objective assessment of viable weapon solutions, we found that service sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution or a narrow range of solutions early on, before an AOA is conducted. The timing of AOAs has also been problematic. Some AOAs are conducted under compressed timeframes in order to meet a planned milestone or weapon system fielding date and are conducted concurrently with other key activities required to become a program of record. This can short-change a comprehensive assessment of risks and preclude effective cost, schedule, and performance trade offs from taking place prior to beginning development.

Some of these findings could (as in maybe) apply to the SSBN-X, I think.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Navy, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request (all tags)

I’ve got a new article up over at the Royal United Services Institute website examining what UK defense priorities should be from an American perspective. Here’s my setup:

Looking ahead, the new US Quadrennial Defense Review released in February placed new emphasis on the non-traditional threats posed by irregular warfare, potential WMD proliferation and terrorist attacks, hybrid warfare combining high- and low-tech tactics, climate change, and the loss of shared access to the 'global commons' in air, sea, space, and cyberspace. Dependable access to these commons forms the backbone of the global order from which the UK benefits politically, economically, and militarily. Yet access to the commons is being contested today by state and non-state actors using asymmetric strategies and capabilities. The UK Ministry of Defence's recent Adaptability and Partnership Green Paper and Future Character of Conflict report offered similar assessments of a future security environment that will be contested, congested, cluttered, connected, and constrained.

To overcome these nontraditional threats, the Quadrennial Defense Review recommended rebalancing the US military to better support six key missions:

1. Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;

2. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
   
3. Build the security capacity of partner states;
   
4. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
   
5. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
   
6. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
   

Because of its historical and political comparative advantages, the UK is well-suited to orient itself toward missions 2, 3, 5, and 6.

On Mission 5, I have the following to say about UK Trident:

It is also worth noting that despite his disarmament rhetoric, President Obama seems committed to keeping the US nuclear deterrent - and by extension the nuclear umbrella protecting US allies - viable for as long as these weapons exist. For example, the Obama administration has announced plans to spend billions of dollars on refurbishment of the B61 gravity bomb, a next-generation bomber, and a successor to the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine. Such investments leave UK policymakers free to decide about Trident based on their own military and political calculations, not some misperception that the US plans to unilaterally disarm anytime soon.

Not the most inspiring analysis for arms controllers, I know, but still an important point to make in response to the “Folding our nuclear umbrella” meme.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Iraq & Afghanistan, New START, FY 2011 Budget Request, Trident (all tags)

The always-scooping Christopher Cavas reports:

Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the House Seapower subcommittee, complained in a letter sent Thursday to Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the Navy “refuses to share” the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for the SSBN(X) program — a document that, Taylor says in the letter, was completed last year.

Rather than commit to replacing the current crop of large Ohio-class submarines armed with Trident II D5 ballistic missiles with similar ships, Taylor wants to see what a smaller, Virginia-class submarine armed with a less-lethal ballistic missile would cost. Instead, he says, the Navy already has decided it wants the bigger and more expensive ships — which some sources say could cost as much as $70 billion.

“I have repeatedly asked officials of the Department of the Navy if less-expensive alternatives to building the Ohio-class were examined,” Taylor said in the letter. “I have repeatedly been told that only the Trident solution met the requirement.”

Rep. Taylor understands the chart below and can clearly do the math: if replacing the Ohio-class SSBN fleet costs $85 billion and eats into funding for other Navy shipbuilding—like, say, the surface combatants built in Mississippi that employ at least 11,250 people in Gulfport and Pascagoula—then his district would take a serious economic hit.

The key question is whether Taylor’s parochial preference for a smaller, cheaper SSBN-X might actually comport with broader U.S. national security requirements. I for one would like to read the analysis of alternatives to see what the Navy thinks about a smaller, cheaper boomer.

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Congress, Navy, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Trident (all tags)

I need a new home!

InsideDefense.com (subscription only) reports that it will cost $339 million to make the new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capable of carrying nuclear weapons, according to U.S. Air Force officials.  

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey continue to host an estimated 200 B61-3 and -4 gravity bombs for delivery by various U.S. and NATO aircraft, including the “dual-capable” F-16 fighter-bomber that the JSF is slated to replace. Like the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) before it, the 2010 NPR punted on the question of U.S. tacnukes in Europe, concluding that “Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”

Yet the $339 million price tag to wire-up the B61 and JSF does not represent the full cost of maintaining nuclear-capable U.S. aircraft in Europe. As Malcolm Chalmers wrote recently:

The US is obliged to maintain a special infrastructure for the purpose [of maintaining nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe], together with the posting of around 1,500 of its service personnel (250 in each of six [US Munitions Support Squadrons] bases) in expensive foreign security postings. Ongoing threats from terrorism further add to the risks against which these bases must guard themselves.

Because of these costs, the U.S. military has long questioned the usefulness of continuing to deploy U.S. tacnukes in Europe. Chalmers noted:

As early as the 1970s, there was a fierce internal Pentagon dispute as to whether the increased weight and complexity required to wire the USAF’s F-16s for the nuclear role, together with the training required to provide a useable capability, justified the costs in reduced conventional capability.

Those questions have not disappeared. As one senior leader of USEUCOM put it to the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, “We pay a king’s ransom for these things [nuclear weapons in Europe] and…they have no military value.” The Task Force of course disagreed with this assessment, arguing that such an attitude ignores the political and psychological value that tacnukes possess as a concrete U.S. commitment to NATO security.

But are tacnukes really the best way to address squishy concerns like politics and psychology, particularly when the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal already provides a credible “over the horizon” deterrent? Not every problem needs to have a (redundant) military solution, after all, particularly when enormous budgetary pressures confront the U.S. military in the years ahead. If the Soviets probably aren’t coming through the Fulda Gap anytime soon, then maybe it’s time to do something totally unprecedented in U.S. defense planning—make a tough choice!—and reallocate resources toward the most serious and most likely threats confronting the United States in the 21st century.

Anyway, here are the key excerpts from the InsideDefense.com article…

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, B61, Air Force, tactical nuclear weapons, Extended Deterrence, F-35 (all tags)

In this morning’s WSJ, NSA Jim Jones rebuts the paper’s April 17 editorial claiming that New START places too many restrictions on U.S. missile defenses. Jones argues that the treaty’s limits on converting ICBM silos for missile defense interceptors is not a problem because the United States would probably just dig new holes, which is apparently cheaper than converting existing silos, if it ever needed to add additional missile defense silos in California or elsewhere.

Sounds reasonable, although one wonders what the timeline would be for converting silos versus building new ones. In a rapidly-developing crisis situation, would the United States have time to dig new holes? I ask because Keith Payne raised concerns about a rapid, unforeseen scenario in his April 8 WSJ op-ed, which will continue to be plagiarized heavily by the Journal and Senate Republicans.

Here’s the full text of Jones’s letter…

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Obama Administration, New START, FY 2011 Budget Request, Missile Defense (all tags)

Taking Nuclear Security Seriously

One year ago this April, President Obama first outlined his goal to “secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years” in order to “ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.”

I don’t want to overstate the threat, but the likelihood of a nuclear attack is far from impossible. In January, a group of activists breached security at the Kleine Brogel air base in Belgium, where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored. A similar incident also took place the previous November. In January, the activists were not only able to hop the simple wire fence to get inside, they were able to enter the area where hardened shelters are located, containing aircraft and 10-20 U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs. Replace those activists with terrorists and the situation could get out of hand.

Unfortunately, the President’s budget for FY 2010 did not live up to his ambitious goal of only four years to secure enough material to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. In fact, it provided over $200 million less than the last budget of the Bush administration.

This year things have changed. President Obama's FY 2011 budget includes a total increase of approximately $320 million for global nuclear security and forecasts growth in the coming years for key programs run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Read more

Nukes on a Blog, Security Matters, FY 2011 Budget Request, Defense Spending, Congress (all tags)

Lockheed Martin's F-35B short-takeoff, vertical-landing (STOVL) stealth fighter completed its very first vertical landing today.

The success couldn't have been better timed.

See it here. The music is great.

Read more

Security Matters, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request, F-35 (all tags)

As might be expected, the Pentagon's budget has increased dramatically since U.S. entry into Afghanistan in 2001.

In inflation-adjusted dollars, the total defense budget has grown from $432 billion in FY01 to $720 billion in FY11, a real increase of approximately 67 percent. The Pentagon’s base budget, which excludes war and nuclear weapons funding, has also grown steadily over the last decade, increasing from $390 billion in FY01 to $540 billion in FY11, a real increase of 38 percent.

See the full analysis here.

Read more

Security Matters, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request (all tags)