First Strike on Euro Missile Defense Aegis Ships? (Part 2)

(Read Part 1)

First Strike Threat

Given these deployment plans, what are the first strike threats to Aegis? It is worthwhile to begin by noting that Aegis ships operating in missile defense mode are more vulnerable to attack. As Lt. Cdr. Greg Smith wrote in a Naval War College paper:

To perform BMD the [Aegis] ship must be positioned between the launch site and the target along its trajectory in order to detect and engage a ballistic missile…The enemy, who knows the trajectory of the weapon, can narrow down the location of the BMD ship, making the ship more vulnerable to attack. Finally, but perhaps most significantly, the Aegis system is less capable versus aircraft and cruise missiles while operating in the missile defense mode.

An Aegis ship operating in the Persian Gulf might be vulnerable to an Iranian assault. To execute its “swarming” doctrine of asymmetric naval warfare, Iran fields 220 fast-attack naval craft; over 125 air-/ground-/sea-launched antiship cruise missiles; more than 2,000 mines; and three Kilo-class submarines (RAND, 59-62). Iranian combat aircraft might also threaten Aegis ships in the Gulf, although the fighters would be easily defeated by U.S. fighters or anti-aircraft missiles.

Aegis ships operating in the eastern Mediterranean might not be safe either. Hezbollah used a shore-based antiship cruise missile to attack the INS Hanit, an Israeli Navy corvette, in the 2006 Lebanon War. Analysts suspect that Iran has supplied its ally Hezbollah with a version of the Chinese-designed C-802 cruise missile which, with a range up to 120 kilometers, might be able to hit Aegis ships operating off the coast of Lebanon. Of course, Hezbollah would be strongly compelled not to aid in this endeavor because doing so would invite retaliation by the United States.

Lastly, Iran might attempt to disable the X-band radar through a missile strike. While it would be unlikely that relatively inaccurate Iranian missiles could successfully destroy the radar, The Caucasus would be within range of Iran’s medium-range missiles.

Conclusion

The vulnerability of Aegis ships to a first strike and the system’s less-than-perfect test record suggest that the new European missile defense proposal might contribute very little beyond the deterrent effects already provided by existing U.S. military capabilities. If Iran acts rationally, it will be deterred from launching either a first strike against U.S. Aegis ships or a missile attack against U.S. bases or allies in Europe or the Middle East because doing so would incur unacceptable costs.

Since defense planning is about worst case scenarios, however, one must ask what happens if deterrence fails. Indeed, deterrence failure remains the principal rationale for developing theater missile defense systems that offer protection from countries, such as Iran and North Korea, seen as the least likely to be deterred because of their (potentially) power-hungry or revolutionary characteristics.

Several prudent steps can be taken by the United States to protect its Aegis system from a potential first strike and maximize the benefits of deployment. None of these actions represents a significant divergence from current U.S. policy.

•    Ensure that the United States possesses enough Aegis ships to fulfill both the new Iranian-focused missile defense mission and existing missions
•    Verify that the time required to surge additional Aegis ships to the region in a crisis situation does not create a window of vulnerability
•    When deploying Aegis ships to the Persian Gulf for missile defense duties, make sure that they are adequately protected with accompanying naval and air assets
•    If possible, keep Aegis ships out of the range of shore-to-ship cruise missiles
•    Protect the new X-band radar site, whether land- or sea-based, with passive and active defenses so it cannot be destroyed by Iranian missile attacks