Last week Stewart once again sported his nuke policy wonk credentials in an interview with Fox News' Bill O'Reilly. Below is a brief excerpt from the exchange on nukes, which occurred in the context of O'Reilly vetting Stewart for a hypothetical O'Reilly-Stewart '12 ticket.  A transcript of the full conversation can be read here. Or watch it beginning at the 1:22 mark of the embedded video.

O'REILLY: All right, let's go to Iran. If you're my VP, I'm going to have to put you in charge of very delicate negotiations. Now Iran's building, you know, nuclear weapons over there. And if they get them, they might give them to some guy named Ahmed, who might take then to them Cleveland and blow everything up. So what are we going to do with that?

STEWART: Well, doesn't Pakistan have a nuclear weapon?

O'REILLY: Yes, they do.

STEWART: Well, couldn't they give it to somebody?

O'REILLY: I don't know. I don't think…

STEWART: Doesn't Russia have nuclear weapons?

O'REILLY: Russia does.

STEWART: Couldn't they give it to somebody?

O'REILLY: They could.

STEWART: The problem isn't the country that gets them. The problem seems to be the weapon." [emphasis mine.]

After reflecting upon the 3 days I spent reading transcripts, budget documents, and procurement plans in order to write the post, however, I decided MiCy just wasn’t getting the job done.

Don’t lie. You know you get amped when they play it at WSC. Anyone? Anyone?

UPDATE 2:20PM: A friend-of-NOH emails in this doozy. I'm pretty sure I spotted Kirk Bansak in there. ]]> http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/2/5/141126/3468 Fri, 05 Feb 2010 19:11:26 -0000 http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/2/5/135039/0467 The big funding increase for nuclear nonproliferation has become, at this point, a well-developed part of the narrative surrounding the new fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget. Vice President Biden messaged it in the Wall Street Journal. An administration apparatchik followed up on background with tastemaker Laura Rozen. And the press guys (and they are all guys) covered it: Fleck, Landay, Matishak, Pincus, and Ambinder.

More nonproliferation funding is always good. If the Pentagon is as serious about stopping nuclear terrorism as the 2010 QDR suggests, it ought to spend at least 0.074 percent of its total budget on Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, as is proposed for FY 2011, right?

Yet there’s more to the nuke game than nonproliferation. Yep, you guessed it: I’m talking about hardware. How much leg did the FY 2011 budget show on new nuclear bombers and submarines? And what does it mean for President Obama’s arms control agenda? Read on, read on…

Long Range Strike (aka Next Generation Bomber)

For FY 2011, the Air Force requested $199 million in research and development (R&D) funding to develop a “Long Range Strike capability in support of Air Force Global Strike and Global Persistent Attack Concept of Operations.” In FY 2011, the money will go toward supporting the industrial base, program planning, and requirements review and definition. What the hell does that mean?

The Pentagon is paying for a study, basically. As Undersecretary for Policy Michele Flournoy remarked on February 1:

One of the insights that came out of this QDR was that we needed to take a much more in-depth look at the full range of capabilities for long-range ISR and precision-strike, and the whole question of a follow-on strategic bomber. And so one of the things we decided in the QDR is that we weren't ready to make definitive long-term programmatic decisions; that we wanted to make some investments that would keep technological opportunities going, but we wanted to take some time to get this right and to study it in much more depth.

A so-called “tiger team” did study long range strike as part of the 2010 QDR. Sticking to his script, Sen. John Thune (R-SD) asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates February 2 (check minute 103) why it was necessary to study it yet again. “I think what the studies up to now have been is whether, and now the study is what,” Gates said in response. He added, “We’re talking about a bomber that would probably not appear into the force until the late ‘20s.”

Some murky indication has been given about what the “what” is going to be for long range strike:

--The 2010 QDR said the new study will examine “what combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades.” The QDR also mentioned the capacity of Virginia-class submarines for long range strike; naval unmanned combat aerial systems; a new joint Air Force-Navy cruise missile; and conventional prompt global strike prototypes.

--The FY 2011 Air Force budget documents stated, “capability areas of interest include advanced sensors, electronic warfare and countermeasures, survivability, manufacturing readiness, ‘net ready’ and communications, open systems architectures and multi-level security, missions management, weapons and combat ID.”

--The new 30-year aircraft investment plan said, “A study is underway to identify the right mix of manned and unmanned technologies that will provide future long-range strike capabilities and to determine the right balance between range, payload, speed, stealth, and onboard sensors. A product of that study will be the identification of a replacement aircraft for the aging aircraft in the legacy bomber fleet and the timing and funding profile required to support this aircraft.”

--At its budget rollout February 1, Air Force Deputy for Budget Marilyn Thomas said the $199 million in FY 2011 long rang strike funding is “primarily in the areas of [low-observable] sensors and net-ready [data links].”

Got all that? Yeah, me neither. What I do got, however, is certainty that funding for this effort is going to accelerate in the years ahead. Between 2011 and 2015, the Air Force budget projects spending $1.7 billion in total R&D on long range strike.

After the capabilities study evolves into an investment profile, expenditures might really ramp up. Here’s what is projected by the new 30-year aircraft investment plan.

Next Generation Ballistic Missile Submarine (aka SSBN-X)

For FY 2011, the Navy requested $493 million in R&D funding for the Sea Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD aka SSBN-X) program. According to Navy budget documents, this money will go toward “design, systems engineering, prototyping, and vendor qualification activities needed to execute the schedule for Common Missile Compartment (CMC) design, and whole ship design and component development technologies.” The United States is designing and building the missile compartment earlier than other parts of the ship. The compartment work will then be spun off to help the UK develop its own next generation SSBN.

Between 2011 and 2015, the Navy projects spending about $3.7 billion in R&D funding for the SBSD, which includes many overlapping development activities happening at the same time. (Naval officials this week put the 2011-2015 figure at around $6 billion, although I don’t see that total in the actual line items)

Right now, the SSBN-X program is structured to procure at least 12 ships. As the new 30-year shipbuilding plan noted, however, “Should the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review change the SSBN requirements, the number of replacement ships may need to be adjusted to accommodate that outcome.” The plan also emphasized that procurement must start on time in FY 2019 and that schedule slippages are not an option:

Recapitalization must start no later than FY 2019 to ensure operational submarines will be available to replace these vital assets as they leave operational service… It is especially critical that these ships meet their scheduled deliveries as they are one-for-one replacements for ships fulfilling, real-time, Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent missions in support of national strategic objectives…There is no leeway in this plan to allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.

A few weeks ago I wrote about the Navy potentially not wanting to pay for the SSBN-X “out of hide,” meaning out of its regular shipbuilding budget. The 30-year plan appears to have put a hex on that notion. The plan states, “Contrary to previous plans, this FY 2011 shipbuilding plan includes the provision for funding SSBN recapitalization from the Navy’s expected shipbuilding funds.” The chart below shows why this is not an insignificant consideration.

The final SSBN-X will be procured in FY 2033 according to the 30-year plan. When SSBN-X procurement is occurring between 2019 and 2033, look below at the overall effect on the number of new ships the Navy can buy per year. It’s about one-half a ship less per year, or seven fewer total ships between 2019 and 2033. That’s not the end of the world, but it is an important strategic tradeoff to think about.

Conclusion

In the short term, can the United States develop new nuclear delivery vehicles while simultaneously pursuing negotiated reductions in warheads and delivery vehicles? I don’t see why not. As President Obama articulated in his Prague speech last year, “As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.” Maintaining a robust, modernized nuclear force structure with upgraded delivery vehicles is consistent with a policy of minimum deterrence, which the 2010 QDR supports by endorsing “a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels consistent with U.S. and allied interests.” Russia is building new delivery vehicles right now too, so it possesses no legitimate basis for opposing U.S. modernization.

In the longer term, however, the procurement schedules outlined above show the United States building new nuclear bombers and submarines well into the 2030s. Based on the preliminary descriptions, both the new bomber and submarine will represent significant technological advancements over the systems they are replacing.

If we allow that technological innovation plays some role in strategic competition (don’t use the R-word!), can nuclear warheads be reduced while the means for their delivery are made ever more lethal? Will Russia see a whiz-bang new U.S. bomber as a “one-to-one” replacement for a B-52 built 50 years ago?

In other words, can President Obama develop new nuclear delivery vehicles while simultaneously pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons? Or, by allowing the development of new delivery vehicles today, is he essentially locking in the nuclear status quo for decades?

Those aren’t rhetorical questions. I seriously don’t know the answers. But it’s something that we need to think about.

h/t: Who else?

North Korea’s last round of short-range missile launches in October were passed off by many observers as evidence of Pyonyang’s ‘two-track’ strategy of asserting strength whilst trying to bring the Obama administration back to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue.  So was last week’s artillery barrage near the ROK border.  References to bargaining chips, double standards and even ‘the juvenile behavior of a teenager’ continue to pepper analysis of most North Korean belligerency.   As North-South relations warm with talk of a possible summit between Kim Jong-Il and President Lee Myung-bak, any tests in the next few days will no doubt also be explained in similar terms.  However, should we accept this conventional wisdom…

Whilst North Korea is mainly known for its SCUD-derivative Hwasong, Rodong and Taepodong series of ballistic missiles, its October 2009 tests involved suspected KN-02 missile technology.  Like the rest of the North Korean missile program, the KN-02 is based on old Soviet technology (in this case the reverse engineered 9K79 Tochka provided to North Korea by Syria in 1996).  However, what separates the the KN-02 from the rest of the North’s missile arsenal is that it uses solid-fuel, is more accurate than the notoriously inaccurate SCUD derivatives, and is road mobile.  The KN-02 allegedly also flies a cruise missile profile, making it difficult for PATRIOT missile batteries located in South Korea to intercept.  If fired from close enough to the DMZ, it could target U.S. military installations in the ROK.

Given the success of previous KN-02 tests, it is somewhat notable that all five of last October’s tests were considered failures.  Whilst the North is well known for shortcomings in its long-range missile program, it is regarded as being relatively accomplished in the area of short- and medium-range missile design.  Consequently, could the October tests have been experimental tests of enhanced KN-02 technology?  

Bruce Bennett of RAND suggests that “North Korea may well be testing some different fuel, engine, or other missile variations, perhaps preparing to apply the KN-02 technology to a larger missile.’  Bennett notes that the missiles flew further, or at least in a manner which suggested they had a longer range (130km – 160km), than previously expected.  Interestingly, these tests also came just twenty days after Iran’s very own short range, solid-fuel missile tests.  Was this just coincidence or evidence of another Iran-DPRK missile cooperation project?

If the failed October 2009 tests do represent Pyonyang’s attempt to further enhance its KN-02 technology, then it’s likely that any short-range launches in the next few days will involve the testing of more KN-02 derivatives.  Given the last round of KN-02 tests received a somewhat muted diplomatic reaction, its possible that further tests might also get brushed off merely as attention grabbing behavior.  Consequently Pyonyang could get away with enhancing its firepower without damaging its ever-improving relations with the South.  The finished product may too become a hit on the export market; small enough to hide in a van and seemingly light enough to transport by small aircraft.  

Given current food shortages it would seemingly take a lot more than just juvenile behavior for Pyonyang to ban its own fishing trawlers from so many of its waters.    Further tests should therefore be understood as being motivated by more than just an attempt to gain international attention.

Starting in FY 2011 the B-2A will receive funding across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to improve the [Defensive Management System] on the aircraft. This initiative will allow the B-2A to continue operations around the world in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. The B-2A will also have funding increased for the Weapon System Support Center (WSSC) which enables testing of current as well as developmental aircraft systems. The B-52H is undergoing several modernization programs in order to maintain its viability through 2040. Current initiatives include installing the 1760 bus on the B-52H for increased smart weapon capability while progressing with the Strategic Radar Replacement program, aimed at replacing its current radar (which is experiencing sustainment and obsolescence issues). The B-52H Extremely High Frequency program integrates communications and data and supports United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) requirements for secure, survivable communications via Emergency Action Messages.

As part of the effort to sustain ICBMs, funding was realigned in FY 2011 to complete the installation of new environmental control systems at the launch facilities. The Air Force also procured more Minuteman III test equipment over the FYDP to provide the necessary flight test components for follow-on test and evaluation launches to ensure reliability, accuracy and viability of the fielded ICBM force. Additionally, funding provided for the development of software to validate message generator processes critical for nuclear certification. The FY 2011 Budget Request includes $295M to modernize out-dated fuzing mechanisms and to sustain test equipment and environmental control systems for the aging but capable Minuteman III ICBMs. The UH-1N that supports missile launch complexes will begin replacement activities with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date of FY 2015. The Air Force continues to analyze and address requirements to maintain the Minuteman III ICBM to 2030 as directed by Congress.

Raise your right hand and repeat after him: The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is the only declared nuclear power that is not modernizing its nuclear forces. The United States is…