Come get some:

But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record  widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964.

The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country nuclear arms race in the region.

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Predictions of catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries -- expecting that their neighbors will be nuclear powers -- to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.

Nightmare scenarios are dangerous for yet another reason: the expected consequences of a nuclear Iran, real or imagined, will determine the policies pursued to prevent Tehran from developing the bomb. If the consequences are out of sync with reality, the methods applied will be disproportional to the threat. Seven years ago, the United States walked into Iraq based on worst-case-scenario predictions about its nuclear program that were far from beyond a reasonable doubt. Washington cannot afford to wage another war on false pretenses.

There is no question that the world would be better off if Iran did not obtain nuclear weapons, and the international community must use all appropriate measures to prevent Iran -- or any other country -- from doing so. But the case against a nuclear Iran is strong enough without a nuclear domino myth. By invoking worst-case scenarios, policymakers are only clouding nuanced thinking.

Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
-    to protect and reassure allies;
-    to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
-    to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;  
-    to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.

As for North Korea’s nuclear motivations, Morgan said that the ever increasing gap between North and South’s economic, military and political indicators led to vulnerability and resulted in a “terrible deterrence problem,” which Pyongyang“has worked very hard to try and overcome” by building its own nuclear weapons.

Morgan explained that many of Washington’s current policy goals cannot be realized through the provision of extended deterrence in the region. He highlighted how little the nuclear umbrella has helped in reversing North Korea’s nuclear program, curbing its proliferation related activities or in limiting its capacity to conduct nuclear blackmail. However, he did concede that Washington’s extended deterrence has been useful in keeping allies from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Morgan said Washington’s current North Korea approach would not achieve results because the real target is, and should be, China, not the North. He explained, “doing it the way we’re doing it now is putting more and more pressure on North Korea in the [same] way we’re trying to put a lot of pressure on the Taliban in Afghanistan – and they’ve got a fallback…[in this case] Chinese supplies, aid, and investments.”

He added, “in effect, we have tried hard to budge North Korea and we have had no success. China has tried to budge North Korea with an alternative approach, also without success. If we don’t get success because of their efforts, we have serious costs in terms of what we want. But if they don’t get a success in terms of our efforts, they [in contrast] are not paying a huge price.”

To achieve positive outcomes in the current context, Morgan recommended the U.S. gradually detach extended nuclear deterrence from the North Korea problem, and then try to find adjustments in the regional security management arrangement to compensate for the detachment. He suggested that one such adjustment could be a strengthening of conventional forces in the area.  Morgan also recommended adjusting Chinese and Russian positions. One way to do so, in terms of deterrence theory, would be threatening to act in ways that will damage Beijing’s interests.

Dr. Victor Cha, the CSIS Korea Chair, agreed with Morgan that extended deterrence has not been overly successful in the North East Asian context. While underscoring the utility of it in helping deter a second Korean war or an attack on Japan, Cha pointed to Washington’s inability to deter Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests and conventional belligerence. He also warned that it is unclear how North Korea would perceive the symbolic ramifications of either maintaining or not extending Washington’s nuclear deterrence. Still, Cha stopped short of recommending an end to the umbrella because it could be perceived by the North as an admission of defeat and perhaps give Pyongyang a misconceived confidence of “nuclear superiority” on the Korean peninsula.”

Cha believed that extended deterrence was increasingly becoming symbolic and most often used by senior U.S. officials to reassure allies of Washington’s unchanging commitment to its nuclear umbrella.. He cited U.S. visits to the ROK and Japan immediately after both nuclear tests as evidence of this.  However, Cha warned that such reassurance is perceived by allies as situational, and that they are receiving mixed signals from the U.S. He explained, “Any time you take an action of reassurance…. it registers as a positive statement, but it’s only because of the situation...On the other hand, when the U.S. says they will not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons [as in September 2005], that is not situational. That truly reflects American disposition. [So] this is a constant battle in the reassurance game.”

To deal with the current impasse, Robert Carlin, Co-Chair of the National Committee on North Korea said, “There’s a lot of things we have to know about their [North Korea] concept of the utility of their nuclear weapons, apart from the public statements. Unless we sit down and talk to them about it at length, in depth, we are not going to be able to figure out the danger points, the points at which they may have misconceptions, and the points they are willing not to press on the nuclear issue – not to use it for compellence (sic)”

Victor Cha later agreed with Carlin’s point of view, but pointed to the policy dilemma currently facing policy makers in the U.S.  While admitting it would be useful to debate nuclear deterrence with North Korea, as was done with the Soviets during the Cold War, he said, “Even if you don’t explicitly or tacitly accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the minute you engage in that dialogue, everybody’s going to say you are accepting a nuclear North Korea, and that will have all sorts of ripple effects throughout the region, particularly among allies, who will then question the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence.”

After reaffirming the U.S. commitment of extended nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia, State Department representative Jofi Joseph pointed out, “It’s very, very difficult for any U.S. administration to engage in such talks unless that issue [nuclear issue] is front and center. The reason why we frankly care about North Korea is because of what they have done in the nuclear field, and without that, this wouldn’t be high on the agenda for any administration.”

Lamenting on the current impasse, Robert Carlin remarked, “I wouldn’t think that bad policy would be sustainable for a long time, except that it has been since 2002… and I’m afraid it can last longer. Not because there aren’t smart people in the right places, but because the politics of the situation, not just in this country, but among our allies, just don’t favor the right decisions and the sense of leadership coming to the fore. It’s not hopeless, but perhaps it’s a good time to go fishing.”

The event was organized by the Korea Chair and the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Committee on North Korea in Washington D.C.

If it is brought up, "a large number of Republicans will be in favor of the [New START] treaty, but not all of them," he said.

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"I think a large majority of Republicans agree with me" on arms reduction, he said.

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“I think we will not deal with the treaty on the floor until after the election."

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"No I'm not predicting anything" when asked if it will pass by the end of this year, "beyond the fact that I think we will get to the floor and we'll have a chance to vote upon it, debate it in the lame-duck session."

Here’s hoping that Lugar’s optimistic estimate of his colleagues’ support is based on an actual nose count, not an assumption that they are as principled, knowledgeable, and reasonable as he is.

Wu reportedly proposed resuming nuclear negotiations in three phases, according to South Korean media:

1. Hold U.S.-North Korea direct talks

2.Hold unofficial, preliminary six-party talks privately behind closed doors

3. Hold official six-party talks

Wu reportedly said Beijing and Pyongyang have agreed on this method, and China is now trying to convince Seoul and later Tokyo, Washington and Russia to accept the plan.  The Chinese envoy’s trip coincided with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s North Korea visit and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s China tour.

Reaction to the Proposal?

Seoul and Washington have maintained that Pyongyang must take responsibility over sinking the Cheonan before resuming six-way negotiations.  Many observers believe that Pyongyang is trying to avoid responsibility with China’s help by dangling the possibility of resuming nuclear talks.

Beijing’s handling of the Cheonan incident has upset the other members of the six-party talks (minus Russia). So it may not be easy for China, the chair of the six-party talks, to coax Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. It remains to be seen what card Beijing plays to win the others over.

IF Pyongyang does have the will to denuclearize and proves this with concrete actions, then it will be difficult for Seoul and Washington to endlessly demand an apology before resuming the six-party talks.

The Gap: Still Wide

The problem, which has been so since the first nuclear crisis, is the wide gap in perception between the two sides. On one side, Pyongyang continues to deny its involvement in Cheonan, insist on the lifting of sanctions and insist on signing a peace treaty before denuclearization. On the other side, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo demand denuclearization steps first.

South Korea, the U.S. and Japan are unified in their policy and approach toward North Korea, which has been a rare phenomenon in the past. On the other side is China and North Korea. It is unclear what hidden cards will be played to break the current impasse.

Former President Jimmy Carter has departed Pyongyang to return home with missionary Aijalon Mahli Gomes who was sentenced to eight years of hard labor and fined $700,000 for illegal entry into North Korea, according to a statement released by the Carter Center. "At the request of President Carter, and for humanitarian purposes, Mr. Gomes was granted amnesty by the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-Il," the statement said. Carter's "private and humanitarian" mission was accomplished, but history has shown that trips by former U.S. presidents to free hostages are hardly ever entirely private and humanitarian.

Kim Jong-il is currently in China (read previous post) and has reportedly continued his tour without heading back home while Carter had reportedly extended his stay in Pyongyang apparently waiting to meet Kim. Some sources say Carter did not sit down with Kim Jong-il as widely expected. One way to interpret this phenonemon is that Kim intentionally did not meet, and never wanted to meet, Carter. If true, then why? Here are some possible scenarios (of course partly based on speculation):

1. Kim Jong-il may have wanted to send a clear message to  Washington: It will also play hardball. In other words, in the face of a tough U.S. that continues to harden its policy of containment toward Pyongyang with additonal sanctions, the regime wanted to snub the U.S. by ignoring a country's most senior-level visitor, a former president; or...

2. Kim Jong-il may have concluded that he would not be able to get the most out of playing the "Carter card" consdering Carter's role and status in relation to the Obama administration. He may have concluded that Carter is not, in reality, Obama's envoy; or...

3. He sees the current geopolitical dynamic as "U.S.-South Korea" vs. "China-North Korea."

If history serves as a lesson in explaining current events and forecasting the future, it may be safe to predict that the current state of tension between the U.S. and North Korea will continue for the time being. Carter's first trip to North Korea led to dialgoue between Washington and Pyongyang after meeting the late founder Kim Il-sung. It could be argued that dialogue is unforeseeable in the near future since Kim Jong-il did not meet Carter this time.

Kim's reported trip coincides with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's in Pyongyang (read previous post) to secure the release of an American missionary. Carter was widely expected to sit down with Kim, and it is unclear whether that meeting was held before Kim departed for China. IF Carter and Kim did not meet, then it may be because Kim felt a China trip to be much more urgent.

Why is Kim Jong-il in China? When analysing North Korea, it is always easy to speculate than offer concrete analysis based on confirmed facts because the regime is in a black box. Still, we can do some "brain exercises" and think of possible scenarios:

1. The most widely speculated reason: Perhaps to solidfy Beijing's recognition support for his youngest son Kim Jong-un as his successor since Kim's health is said to be fast deteriorating and ahead of a rare and crucial leadership meeting of the ruling Workers' Party. There has been much speculation that Kim may announce his successor at that meeting. Many experts have speculated they need China's seal of approval for his successor, but some experts argue that Pyongyang does not require Beijing's approval on how to run its internal affairs; or...

2. Kim Jong-il realized the flood crisis is more serious than expected and needs China's help; or...

3. He needs medical treatment in China because of he is said to be very ill; or...

4. He wanted to go down memory lane in China and pass down family stories to his son, heir-apparent Kim Jong-un, before passing away because of his ailing health. Kim visited the middle school his father and nation founder Kim Il-sung attended, which was something he reportedly wanted to do for years.