Sell Your Dominoes Someplace Else, We're All Stocked Up Here
Kingston | Sep 02, 2010 |
1 Friend of NoH Johan Bergenas hit the online pages of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday to make that case that an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, while something we should seek to prevent, would not cause a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East. He makes a persuasive case, because, well…Johan is a persuasive guy. And did I mention that the piece has a great title: “The Nuclear Domino Myth”? Nice.
Come get some:
But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964.
The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country nuclear arms race in the region.
[snip]
Predictions of catastrophic consequences resulting from a nuclear Iran are not only wrong but counterproductive. The assertion that the widespread proliferation is unavoidable could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The myth of a nuclear domino effect creates an excuse for other Middle Eastern countries -- expecting that their neighbors will be nuclear powers -- to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.
Nightmare scenarios are dangerous for yet another reason: the expected consequences of a nuclear Iran, real or imagined, will determine the policies pursued to prevent Tehran from developing the bomb. If the consequences are out of sync with reality, the methods applied will be disproportional to the threat. Seven years ago, the United States walked into Iraq based on worst-case-scenario predictions about its nuclear program that were far from beyond a reasonable doubt. Washington cannot afford to wage another war on false pretenses.
There is no question that the world would be better off if Iran did not obtain nuclear weapons, and the international community must use all appropriate measures to prevent Iran -- or any other country -- from doing so. But the case against a nuclear Iran is strong enough without a nuclear domino myth. By invoking worst-case scenarios, policymakers are only clouding nuanced thinking.
North Korea and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Extended Deterrence in East Asia
Tad | Sep 01, 2010 | 0 
A panel of experts on Monday discussed the utility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrence, in East Asia in the wake of a nuclear North Korea. The experts agreed that the U.S. policy of extended nuclear deterrence is doing little to stimulate North Korean denuclearization, but has been effective symbolically.
Leading the discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC on “North Korea and the U.S Nuclear Umbrella in North East Asia,” Dr. Patrick Morgan of the University of California said that the U.S. originally had several aims for extending nuclear deterrence to allies in North East Asia:
- to protect and reassure allies;
- to project U.S. power and become part of the region’s security management structure;
- to constrain allies by reducing the impetus for them to go nuclear;
- to build “better communities” by historically allowing for substantial adjustments in the capacities of states in the region such as China and Japan.
North Korea, nuclear, Nukes on a Blog, Inter-Korean relations (all tags)
U.S. Announces More Sanctions on North Korea
Duyeon | Aug 30, 2010 | 0 The U.S. Treasury Department's website on August 30th announced expanded sanctions on North Korea via a presidential executive order. Washington slapped sanctions on four individuals and eight firms with ties to the North Korean government and the regime's nuclear programs. Room 39 is among the blacklisted entities, which is believed to be engaged in illicit activities that fund Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. The new sanctions are based on President Bush's Executive Order 13382 to curb nuclear and WMD proliferation. Click here for the full text of the announcement.
U.S., sanctions, North Korea, Treasury, luxury, non-proliferation, executive order, Room 39 (all tags)
Lugar’s Delicious Leaves of Tea
Travis | Aug 30, 2010 | 1 Sayeth Saint Dick:
If it is brought up, "a large number of Republicans will be in favor of the [New START] treaty, but not all of them," he said.
[snip]
"I think a large majority of Republicans agree with me" on arms reduction, he said.
[snip]
“I think we will not deal with the treaty on the floor until after the election."
[snip]
"No I'm not predicting anything" when asked if it will pass by the end of this year, "beyond the fact that I think we will get to the floor and we'll have a chance to vote upon it, debate it in the lame-duck session."
Here’s hoping that Lugar’s optimistic estimate of his colleagues’ support is based on an actual nose count, not an assumption that they are as principled, knowledgeable, and reasonable as he is.
China Proposes Resuming Six-Party Talks
Duyeon | Aug 27, 2010 | 0 Chinese envoy Wu Dawei met with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul on August 26th to discuss the resumption of the six-party nuclear talks on North Korea's nuclear disarmament. But the meeting merely reaffirmed that the gap in their perception is still wide among the parties.
Wu reportedly proposed resuming nuclear negotiations in three phases, according to South Korean media:
1. Hold U.S.-North Korea direct talks
2.Hold unofficial, preliminary six-party talks privately behind closed doors
3. Hold official six-party talks
Wu reportedly said Beijing and Pyongyang have agreed on this method, and China is now trying to convince Seoul and later Tokyo, Washington and Russia to accept the plan. The Chinese envoy’s trip coincided with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s North Korea visit and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s China tour.
Reaction to the Proposal?
Seoul and Washington have maintained that Pyongyang must take responsibility over sinking the Cheonan before resuming six-way negotiations. Many observers believe that Pyongyang is trying to avoid responsibility with China’s help by dangling the possibility of resuming nuclear talks.
Beijing’s handling of the Cheonan incident has upset the other members of the six-party talks (minus Russia). So it may not be easy for China, the chair of the six-party talks, to coax Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. It remains to be seen what card Beijing plays to win the others over.
IF Pyongyang does have the will to denuclearize and proves this with concrete actions, then it will be difficult for Seoul and Washington to endlessly demand an apology before resuming the six-party talks.
The Gap: Still Wide
The problem, which has been so since the first nuclear crisis, is the wide gap in perception between the two sides. On one side, Pyongyang continues to deny its involvement in Cheonan, insist on the lifting of sanctions and insist on signing a peace treaty before denuclearization. On the other side, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo demand denuclearization steps first.
South Korea, the U.S. and Japan are unified in their policy and approach toward North Korea, which has been a rare phenomenon in the past. On the other side is China and North Korea. It is unclear what hidden cards will be played to break the current impasse.
China, Wu Da-wei, South Korea, North Korea, Kim Jong-il, Cheonan, six-party talks, peace treaty (all tags)
Carter Leaves North Korea, Snubbed by Kim Jong-il?
Duyeon | Aug 26, 2010 | 0 Former President Jimmy Carter has departed Pyongyang to return home with missionary Aijalon Mahli Gomes who was sentenced to eight years of hard labor and fined $700,000 for illegal entry into North Korea, according to a statement released by the Carter Center. "At the request of President Carter, and for humanitarian purposes, Mr. Gomes was granted amnesty by the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-Il," the statement said. Carter's "private and humanitarian" mission was accomplished, but history has shown that trips by former U.S. presidents to free hostages are hardly ever entirely private and humanitarian.
Kim Jong-il is currently in China (read previous post) and has reportedly continued his tour without heading back home while Carter had reportedly extended his stay in Pyongyang apparently waiting to meet Kim. Some sources say Carter did not sit down with Kim Jong-il as widely expected. One way to interpret this phenonemon is that Kim intentionally did not meet, and never wanted to meet, Carter. If true, then why? Here are some possible scenarios (of course partly based on speculation):
1. Kim Jong-il may have wanted to send a clear message to Washington: It will also play hardball. In other words, in the face of a tough U.S. that continues to harden its policy of containment toward Pyongyang with additonal sanctions, the regime wanted to snub the U.S. by ignoring a country's most senior-level visitor, a former president; or...
2. Kim Jong-il may have concluded that he would not be able to get the most out of playing the "Carter card" consdering Carter's role and status in relation to the Obama administration. He may have concluded that Carter is not, in reality, Obama's envoy; or...
3. He sees the current geopolitical dynamic as "U.S.-South Korea" vs. "China-North Korea."
If history serves as a lesson in explaining current events and forecasting the future, it may be safe to predict that the current state of tension between the U.S. and North Korea will continue for the time being. Carter's first trip to North Korea led to dialgoue between Washington and Pyongyang after meeting the late founder Kim Il-sung. It could be argued that dialogue is unforeseeable in the near future since Kim Jong-il did not meet Carter this time.
Jimmy Carter, Kim Jong-il, Gomes, Pyongyang, China (all tags)
Kim Jong-il's Surpise China Visit?
Duyeon | Aug 26, 2010 | 0 North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is reportedly in China and there's speculation his son Kim Jong-un, heir apparent, is traveling with him. Kim Jong-il's China trips are usually confirmed after he returns to the North out of security reasons, but officials have reportedly said they detected signs of his movement. It is also his second visit to China in the same year, and his last one was in May.
Kim's reported trip coincides with that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's in Pyongyang (read previous post) to secure the release of an American missionary. Carter was widely expected to sit down with Kim, and it is unclear whether that meeting was held before Kim departed for China. IF Carter and Kim did not meet, then it may be because Kim felt a China trip to be much more urgent.
Why is Kim Jong-il in China? When analysing North Korea, it is always easy to speculate than offer concrete analysis based on confirmed facts because the regime is in a black box. Still, we can do some "brain exercises" and think of possible scenarios:
1. The most widely speculated reason: Perhaps to solidfy Beijing's recognition support for his youngest son Kim Jong-un as his successor since Kim's health is said to be fast deteriorating and ahead of a rare and crucial leadership meeting of the ruling Workers' Party. There has been much speculation that Kim may announce his successor at that meeting. Many experts have speculated they need China's seal of approval for his successor, but some experts argue that Pyongyang does not require Beijing's approval on how to run its internal affairs; or...
2. Kim Jong-il realized the flood crisis is more serious than expected and needs China's help; or...
3. He needs medical treatment in China because of he is said to be very ill; or...
4. He wanted to go down memory lane in China and pass down family stories to his son, heir-apparent Kim Jong-un, before passing away because of his ailing health. Kim visited the middle school his father and nation founder Kim Il-sung attended, which was something he reportedly wanted to do for years.
Kim Jong-il, China, surprise trip, successor, Kim Jong-un, Carter (all tags)
CARTER TO THE RESCUE… AGAIN
Duyeon | Aug 25, 2010 | 1 August 25, 2010
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is in North Korea to secure the release of Aijalon Mahli Gomes, a 30-year-old American missionary who was sentenced in May to eight years of hard labor and fined $700,000 for illegally entering the North. Carter met Pyongyang’s nominal leader Kim Young-nam and may even sit down with Kim Jong-il. The trip is significant because the release of an American civilian has once again brought a former U.S. president out of retirement at a time when tensions are high between Washington and Pyongyang as well as on the Korean peninsula. What’s more, it comes at a time when the Dear Leader’s health is said to be deteriorating. History has shown that the political environment tends to warm after a former U.S. president flies to the rescue. Why send Carter now and what can we expect from his trip? Click "read more."
Jimmy Carter, North Korea, hostage, Gomes, nuclear (all tags)
Squeezing North Korea Again
Duyeon | Aug 20, 2010 | 0 The U.S. will soon announce a fresh list of sanctions against North Korea to dry up the regime’s illegal cash sources that fund its nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang is expected to unleash more provocations, even a third nuclear test, in retaliation as witnessed in the past. Still, the pressure track is expected to continue until the regime changes its behavior or until a leadership transition takes place in the North. Who are the targets of the sanctions? What are the implications and recommendations? Find out more in my analysis at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website.
Verification, GOP style
Kingston | Aug 19, 2010 | 0 Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Paula DeSutter has spent most of the summer arguing that the New START treaty drops the ball on verification. This is a pretty daft claim, since DeSutter was one of the ring leaders for an administration that believed verification was neither necessary nor useful. Recall that the Moscow Treaty was entirely devoid of any detailed data exchanges and monitoring and verification provisions. In the eyes of DeSutter, President Reagan’s signature phrase “trust but verify” read “trust but don't verify”.
Both Kelsey Hartigan and Greg Thielmann have penned great take-downs of DeSutter's latest contribution, which is particularly stunning and riddled with obfuscation. Writing in the National Review earlier this week, DeSutter alleges:
Had the administration deemed the data provided under START to be critical, they could have extended the START treaty until negotiations on New START were completed and it was ratified by the U.S. and Russia. Instead, they let START expire and negotiated against a deadline after making clear their desperate desire for getting an agreement.[emphasis mine.]Alas, the 2007 version of Paula DeSutter made an extension of START I next to impossible:
While the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START "has been important and for the most part has done its job," Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter told Reuters the pact is cumbersome and its complicated reporting standards have outlived their usefulness.
In the post-Cold war era, many provisions of the 1991 START accord, which mandated deep nuclear weapons cuts, "are no longer necessary. We don't believe we're in a place where we need have to have the detailed lists (of weapons) and verification measures," added DeSutter.[emphasis mine.]Kelsey also points out that DeSutter ran roughshod over the verification provisions in other key arms control treaties.
In last week's Washington Post, Walter Pincus noted that the standard by which many Republican Senators are judging New START is markedly different from the one they used to judge the George W. Bush administration's Moscow Treaty. As we've noted on the blog before, nowhere is this more evident than on the issue of verification. See below the jump for some choice comments from select Republican Senators on verification during the Moscow treaty debate. Could it be, as former Bush I national security adviser Brent Scowcroft has suggested, that "some just don't want to give Obama a victory" before the midterm elections?
Remember, "trust, but don't verify"...
