I Can Lick 30 Earmarks Today!
Laicie | Mar 11, 2010 |
0 
Seuss said it...
In a move partially designed to one-up the Democrats, House Republicans voted today to impose a one-year moratorium on all earmarks, not just those to for-profit companies. The ban, approved by voice vote, would apply not only to appropriations bills but also to authorizing and tax measures.
“Yay!” you say? “One of my biggest fears was yet another earmark for the C-17 or the F-35 extra engine!”
Not so much – It looks as if the so-called ban on added spending may be full of holes. The Hill notes that:
… billions added to the defense bills for existing national security programs under contract with major defense companies such as Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman probably would not be affected.
For example, when House appropriators add more funds for Boeing’s C-17 cargo aircraft, they do not disclose them as earmarks. Instead, they are considered programs essential to national security even though none of the funds are requested by the Pentagon. These funds benefit lawmaker districts where the weapons systems are built.
Further, the Senate does not look to be on board with any current plan for a ban on earmarks. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman, and champion of the C-17, Daniel Inouye has already begun to fight back, remarking that the action was not in the “best interest of the Congress or the American people.”
Today’s announcement is a shrewd political move for a House that has recently been plagued by controversy and talk of corruption, but bears little weight. Congress will not be fighting any tigers in the near future.
Rising Defense Costs Since 2001
Laicie | Mar 11, 2010 | 0 As might be expected, the Pentagon's budget has increased dramatically since U.S. entry into Afghanistan in 2001.
In inflation-adjusted dollars, the total defense budget has grown from $432 billion in FY01 to $720 billion in FY11, a real increase of approximately 67 percent. The Pentagon’s base budget, which excludes war and nuclear weapons funding, has also grown steadily over the last decade, increasing from $390 billion in FY01 to $540 billion in FY11, a real increase of 38 percent.
See the full analysis here.
Security Matters, Defense Spending, FY 2011 Budget Request (all tags)
Revised Russian Nuke Doctrine Revisited
Kingston | Mar 10, 2010 | 0 Guest Post by Cole Harvey
On February 5, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev approved the text of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (available in the original Russian here). The new doctrine had been the subject of some concern before its publication (including from yours truly), following an interview with the secretary of the Russian Security Council in which he suggested that the document would authorize the use of nuclear weapons in “local” conflicts. Thankfully the new military doctrine outlines a far more circumscribed role for nuclear weapons than the secretary had indicated...
Norm Dicks, the next likely Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
Chad | Mar 10, 2010 | 1 
Norman Dicks (D-WA) has spent his entire career on Capitol Hill, having started out as a Senate staffer for Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, and since 1977, serving as a congressmen on the House Appropriations Committee. In March 2010, he was named the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, replacing the late Rep. John Murtha (D-PA)....
Senator Feingold Statement on New START
Kingston | Mar 09, 2010 | 0 Earlier today Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) submitted a statement for the record on the START follow-on agreement (aka New START). The full statement is posted below the jump. Some highlights:
...
The United States and Russia maintain over ninety percent of the world’s approximately 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the capacity to destroy an entire city; collectively, they can destroy the world. The mere existence of these weapons creates the risk of a nuclear accident, unauthorized use, and theft by a terrorist group. The size and structure of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals reflect an antiquated Cold War mindset that we must move beyond.
...
The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that “terrorist use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its friends and allies is more likely than deliberate use by a state.” Our priority, therefore, should be to work together with Russia to reduce the size and vulnerability of our nuclear arsenals, and ensure that proper security and surveillance safeguards are in place.
...
I am encouraged that efforts to negotiate a START follow-on agreement have bipartisan support among national security experts. Notably, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, headed by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger, endorsed a follow-on agreement to START. Similarly, Secretary Perry joined with former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz to pen an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal calling for the extension of the key provisions of START and further reductions in our nuclear stockpile.
The Nuclear Posture Review and the Global Zero Movement
Lauren | Mar 09, 2010 | 0 
Part I of two posts on the Global Zero Movement
The congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which outlines U.S. nuclear strategy, forces, and readiness, has been delayed until, at the earliest, the second half of this month. According to a senior administration official, the review will call for “dramatic reductions in the stockpile,” a “greater role for conventional weapons in deterrence” and ruling out the need for low-yield, bunker-busting nuclear weapons capable of penetrating underground targets.
While this is very encouraging news, there is still some concern that the new NPR will not go far enough towards achieving President Obama’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Reports have indicated that early drafts of the Nuclear Posture Review fell short of the transformational vision put forth by the President in Prague. Here’s to hoping that when he makes his final decisions on the review, President Obama will take his cues from the rapidly growing Global Zero movement rather than those who may be urging him not to stray too far from the status quo…
Nukes on a Blog, Nuclear Posture Review, Global Zero (all tags)
USAF Chief: New START Won’t Require Cuts to Bomber Fleet
Travis | Mar 08, 2010 | 0 Sen. John Thune (R-SD) has something on his mind. No, it’s not David Brooks. It’s the U.S. nuclear triad.
In February, Thune tried to frame the forthcoming U.S. Nuclear Posture Review as a White House-Pentagon schism. Much to Thune’s chagrin, however, Navy CNO Adm. Gary Roughead said he had “been very comfortable with the discussions that we've been having.”
Last week, Thune decided to try try again. This time, he asked Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norman Schwartz during a SASC hearing whether New START and the Quadrennial Defense Review would require cuts to the U.S. bomber fleet. Said Thune:
THUNE: Now, when I posed the question about the substantial cut to the bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That's cause for concern in my view because I've long expressed the fear that there -- it would be proposed by the administration -- in effect a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. And – are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force that -- as they're being envisioned by the QDR?
When I first read that, I thought, “Whoa, that’s weird, Mullen said New START would require bomber cuts? I think I’d remember that!” So I checked the transcript. Here’s what Adm. Mullen actually said on February 2:
THUNE: Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? And, I guess, a following question would be what are the assumptions that are lying what appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers?
MULLEN: I'm not -- I am not aware that -- that we are, although I -- I'd certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that -- that -- that I've got that right, but there certainly hasn't been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers.
Apparently worried about his initial uncertainty on this question, Mullen waited until the end of the hearing and then asked to set the record straight. He then said:
MULLEN: Mr. Chairman, just one for the record and it's -- it's brief. Senator Thune's question I spoke, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn't say was there is consideration for a reduction in number of bombers and overall start in negotiations which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion yet.
Now, this is ambiguous, but I read it as Mullen saying that while New START may reduce the number of nuclear-coded bombers permitted per side, the bombers won’t need to be decommissioned (i.e. cut up). Still, it’s pretty unclear. Luckily, Schwartz brought his A game and offered a solid explanation. He told Thune:
SCHWARTZ: With respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee a reduction in B-52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B-1 is not a nuclear- tasked platform. The B-52 is. If there's a requirement for fewer B- 52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual-tasked.
THUNE: Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles contemplated in the START treaty, though, and those negotiations are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force?
SCHWARTZ: Sir, I don't think that will be the case. I do not.
Well said, General.
Nukes on a Blog, New START, Congress, Senate, Posture Review, Air Force (all tags)
Trident Uncertainties
Chad | Mar 08, 2010 | 0 
The UK's "Vanguard" class SSBN
A 2006 MOD White Paper said that the UK’s current fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines would have to be retired in the early 2020s, estimating that it would take around 17 years to design, manufacture, and commission the replacement boomers. After a controversial vote in the House of Commons in 2007, it looked certain that the UK would replace its Vanguard class submarines as a key part of an extension plan to its at-sea ‘Trident’ nuclear deterrent.
Having devoted £7.7 billion in October 2007 for research and design in the initial ‘Concept Phase’ of the replacement program, the UK Government was scheduled to make ‘Initial Gate’ decisions as early as September 2009. These decisions would have kicked off a series of technical assessments and design work, committing Prime Minister Gordon Brown to pay out some 15% of the estimated £15-20 billion procurement costs for the new submarine.
In July 2009, the Government decided to delay the design contract until 2010. In January 2010, it was reported that the Government had postponed making its ‘Initial Gate’ decisions indefinitely, allegedly due to difficulties in agreeing on the type of nuclear reactors needed to power the future submarines. However, the timing of the announcement casts doubt on the claim that the delay is purely technical in nature. And as the Vanguard retirement clock continues to tick, suggestions of ‘indefinite’ delays call into question the Government’s commitment to the ‘urgent’ nature of the replacement program, as depicted in the White Paper timetable…
Inhofe Issues Two Ratification Threats in 250 Words
Travis | Mar 08, 2010 | 0 
Carp diem
Shorter Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK) from Saturday: if the Obama administration does what the New York Times suggests vis-à-vis nuclear weapons policy and does “not update its remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons to make them safer and reliable,” then Senate approval of New START and the Test Ban Treaty is “unlikely” and “in doubt”. Inhofe also wrote that “While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other countries to enter the nuclear competition.”
Since New START will not enact deep cuts, will not include all of the NYT’s recommendations, and has already been paired with a significant budget increase for safety and reliability work by the nuclear labs, it appears that Inhofe’s preconditions will be satisfied when it comes to New START. He may oppose portions of the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the Test Ban, but that opposition will have nothing to do with the merits of New START, which will include modest nuclear weapons reductions that Inhofe himself grudgingly accepts are warranted.
Inhofe is not the only lawmaker to espouse “OBAMA’S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA IS HORRIBLE (p.s. New START seems mostly ok).” So too does Sen. John Thune (R-SD), whose own Policy Committee admitted that “the triad may be able to sustain certain cuts in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.” Tritto (ditto +1) Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who in 2009 endorsed “a move, as rapidly as possible, to a significantly smaller force.” Even Sen. Jon Kyl’s (R-AZ) anti-arms control MO has not included explicitly opposing New START. Of course, this could all change once New START actually exists. But at this point, the core purpose of the treaty--modest reductions--still seems to enjoy wide bipartisan support.
In other words, Kingston’s analysis from December still rings true:
The approach of some vocal Republicans to the “New START” negotiations goes something like this: suggest a dozen different ways that a new arms control agreement with Russia could be detrimental to U.S. security without actually opposing a new arms control agreement with Russia.
Nukes on a Blog, Congress, New START, CTBT, Posture Review, FY 2011 Budget Request, Senate (all tags)
Listen to Brzezinski
Laicie | Mar 05, 2010 | 0 
Zbigniew Brzezinski
I’ve been thinking a lot about the “inevitability assumption” lately. There is a fundamental problem associated with the assumption that Iran is inevitably going to acquire a nuclear weapon.
Back in December, Jim Walsh, Thomas Pickering, and William Luers hit the problem on the head:
This “inevitability assumption” has been a common belief in the nuclear age, and yet, it has repeatedly turned out to be wrong. The examples include Egypt, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The assumption is tantamount to relying on a worst-case scenario, which in turn has the effect of truncating the list of potential policy options. Worse yet, an assumption that Iran is going nuclear can lead decision-makers to miss the signals and signs when a negotiated settlement is actually possible.
Today, U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Glyn Davies told Christiane Amanpour that “the world's patience with Iran is running out. ‘It's becoming quite clear that they're preserving at least the option of developing a nuclear program. And we want all nations of the world to take note of this and draw the right conclusion.’”
I can only assume the conclusion he speaks of is that Iran is working to build, and will one day acquire, a nuclear weapon. As a result of this conclusion, the U.S. is once again focusing narrowly on sanctions, while others push for more decisive action. Ultimately, though, any and all of these tactics are aimed at preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Not the option of a weapon; not the desire for a weapon; but a fully capable nuclear arsenal able to wipe out… well, anyone at all.
Iran does not currently have this ability…
